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Experiments on Decisions under Uncertainty:  
A Theoretical Framework†
By Eran Shmaya and Leeat Yariv*
The analysis of lab data entails a joint test of the underlying theory 
and of subjects’ conjectures regarding the experimental design 
itself, how subjects frame the experiment. We provide a theoretical 
framework for analyzing such conjectures. We use experiments of 
decision making under uncertainty as a case study. Absent restrictions 
on subjects’ framing of the experiment, we show that any behavior 
is consistent with standard updating (“anything goes”), including 
those suggestive of anomalies such as overconfidence, excess belief 
stickiness, etc. When the experimental protocol restricts subjects’ 
conjectures (plausibly, by generating information during the 
experiment), standard updating has nontrivial testable implications. (JEL C91, D11, D81, D83)
Experiments studying behavior under uncertainty (be it regarding some under-
lying state, such as income in consumption-saving problems, or regarding others’ 
behavior, as is the case in practically all strategic interactions) usually consist of 
three stages. First, the uncertainty is realized; second, subjects are provided with 
partial information about that realization; third, subjects choose an action. When 
analyzing data of such experiments, one essentially tests joint hypotheses regarding 
responses to the experimental design (namely, the realization of uncertainty and the 
information generation procedure) and subjects’ beliefs about the design itself. The 
focus of this paper is the analysis of the potential consequences of such joint tests. 
We allow subjects to hold arbitrary conjectures about the experimental design and 
identify links between classes of conjectures subjects hold and the testable implica-
tions of theoretical predictions in the lab.
The idea that subjects may form (potentially inaccurate) beliefs about an experi-
ment’s design to which they respond is long standing in the social sciences. It falls 
under the general umbrella of experimenter demand, suggesting that the design 
itself makes subjects (consciously or subconsciously) frame the problem at hand 
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in a particular way that makes them believe certain responses are more appropriate 
than others. It has not only been a concern for economists (Zizzo 2010, and refer-
ences therein); it is also considered a potential source of distortion in responses to 
psychological surveys (see Paulhus 1991) and a channel through which subjects in 
sociological experiments choose their actions (see Gillespie 1991). Experimenter 
demand may even play a role in the generation of placebo effects in medicine (see 
Beecher 1955 and work that followed). Despite its importance for experimental 
deductions, the literature has offered little in the form of a theoretical framework 
for inspecting the testable implications of experiments accounting for experimenter 
demand effects. Our goal is to take a step in that direction.
We concentrate on a general case study of laboratory decision making under uncer-
tainty. Most experiments in this class involve some form of updating. Consequently, 
a natural first step in the theoretical analysis of such experiments pertains to exper-
iments having to do with elicitation of beliefs, which are the experiments we study 
in this paper.
We consider experiments in which payoffs depend on some unknown state. After 
the state is realized, a subject is provided with some information regarding the state 
in the form of a sequence of potentially informative signals. Ultimately, the subject 
chooses one of several alternatives. Many extant experiments fall under this cate-
gory (particularly when thinking of other subjects’ actions as part of the state). For 
instance, consumption-saving experiments, individual experimentation and learning 
experiments, herding, and sequential voting experiments all naturally fall under this 
rubric (see, for example, Kagel and Roth 1997 for an overview of experiments in 
different fields of economics).
A Motivating Example.—Before describing our formal results, consider the fol-
lowing example, providing a simple caricature of the structure of experiments of 
decision making under uncertainty.
There are two states of nature,  a and  b , realized at the outset of the experiment . 
For example,  a and  b can stand for whether or not going on vacation is a good idea, 
as in Tversky and Shafir’s (1992) disjunction effect experiments. The subject’s goal 
is to report which of the states is most likely given different amounts of informa-
tion.1 For simplicity, assume that initially, she is given no information. Then she 
receives some information, say in the form of a signal taking the values  u or  d . 
For example, in Tversky and Shafir’s (1992) experiments, subjects were asked to 
contemplate either failing or passing an important exam. Figure 1 captures, up to 
relabeling, the three types of responses one could observe in such an experiment. 
The actions at the roots of each tree correspond to the reports absent any signals, 
while actions at the other two nodes correspond to the subject’s responses following 
the respective signals.
In panel A, the subject does not change her mind regardless of which signal 
she observes. This is consistent with Bayesian updating. For instance, the subject 
may have a strong prior favoring the state  a and view the signals as uninformative. 
In panel B, the subject changes her mind when the signal is  d. This can also be 
1 For instance, she may be paid a fixed amount only when her response matches the realized state. 
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explained with Bayesian updating by assuming, e.g., that the prior for  a is  p > 1/2 
while the signal  s 1 follows the following distribution:
  P ( s 1 = u  |  a) = P ( s 1 = d  |  b) = q and P ( s 1 = d  |  a) = P ( s 1 = u  |  b) = 1 − q ,
where  q > p. Thus, upon observing the signal  u, the subject views  a as more likely 
and upon observing the signal  d, the subject views the state  b as more likely.2
Panel C describes a situation in which regardless of what the signal is, the sub-
ject changes her view of what is the most likely state. These observations cannot be 
explained with simple Bayesian updating. Indeed, if the subject updates in a stan-
dard manner, absent any information, she must put some weight on the realization 
of  s 1 being  u and complementary weight on the realization of  s 1 being  d. In particu-
lar, her belief that the state is  a when she does not observe a signal must be a convex 
combination of her beliefs following the realization of the signal. Thus, unless the 
subject is indifferent, a belief that puts weight lower than  1/2 on the state  a must be 
a convex combination of two beliefs that put weight greater than  1/2 on the state  a , 
which is not possible.
In fact, many experiments that are used to illustrate updating anomalies 
exhibit observations of the form of panel C: Tversky and Shafir’s (1992) disjunc-
tion effect experiments take this format,3 as do an assortment of experiments on 
2 In fact, one can come up with many belief structures for the subject that would be consistent with the observed 
reports and Bayesian updating for either panel A or panel B. 
3 Specifically, Tversky and Shafir (1992) asked students whether they would be interested in a vacation pack-
age that would take place after the results of an exam would be revealed. Thirty-two percent of the subjects were 
interested, 7 percent of the subjects were not interested, and the remaining 61 percent were willing to pay $5 to 
have the option to cancel the vacation after realizing whether they had passed or failed. Nonetheless, when asked 
whether they would buy the same vacation package after discovering they had failed or passed the exam, 57 percent 
or 54 percent, respectively, of the subjects reported affirmatively. 
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overconfidence, belief polarization, etc. (for an overview, see, e.g., Camerer, 
Loewenstein, and Rabin 2006 or Nisbett and Ross 1980).
To summarize, even without placing any restrictions on the subject’s belief about 
the initial distribution of states and the signal generation process, Bayesian updat-
ing has clear testable implications. Panels A and B can be explained, while panel C 
cannot.
In the current paper we also entertain the idea that the subject conjectures the 
amount of information revealed to her by the experimenter is a function of the real-
ized uncertainty: the state and the signals. Then, panel C can easily be explained 
with Bayesian updating with such richer conjectures. For instance, the subject could 
conjecture that a priori the states are equally likely, but that when the state is  b (or 
when the appropriate response is  b ), the experimenter does not reveal any informa-
tion to her, while when the state is  a, the experimenter reveals either signal with 
equal probability. In particular, behavior that seems to suggest anomalous updating 
procedures may be attributed to the subject’s framing of the experiment instead.
Nonetheless, note that in explaining panel C, we only need the subject to conjec-
ture the amount of information depends on the realized state (and not necessarily 
on the realized signals). Such restricted conjectures are relevant for experiments of 
decisions under uncertainty in which there is transparency regarding how signals are 
generated (for example, signals may be generated during the experiment, after their 
number had been determined, as is common practice in, e.g., voting experiments). 
Interestingly, they do entail testable implications.
Consider Figure 2, that illustrates reports from an experiment as above in which 
there are two signal realizations, each taking the value of  u or  d . Note that the  sub-tree 
corresponding to  s 1 = u is of the form appearing in panel C of Figure 1. In partic-
ular, in order to explain the reversal following either signal  s 2 , we need to assume 
the subject conjectures that the mere observation of two signals is more likely when 
the state is  b . However, switch to the other sub-tree corresponding to  s 1 = d. Here, 
we see a similar reversal, but now the subject reports the state  a regardless of  s 2 . 
The only way to explain this would be with a conjecture that makes the observation 
of two signals more likely when the state is  a . It is therefore impossible to explain 
these observations with such restricted conjectures. Thus, transparency of the signal 
generation procedure assures that Bayesian updating has clear testable implications, 
even without restricting the subject’s conjecture on the distribution of the underly-
ing state, signal generation process, and the experimenter’s strategy of information 
revelation (that may depend on the realized state).
This example highlights two important methodological messages of the paper. 
First, when no restrictions are placed on subjects’ framing of the experiment, any 
behavior is consistent with standard updating (“anything goes”). Second, when the 
experimental protocol restricts subjects’ conjectures (say, by generating information 
during the experiment), standard updating entails nontrivial testable implications. 
Namely, such protocols restrict the type of action reversals that Bayesian subjects 
may exhibit when they are provided with additional information.
Description of Results.—In general, the design of an experiment dictates how 
much information, i.e., the number of signals, subjects observe prior to making 
choices. Subjects may hold a wide range of beliefs regarding the link between the 
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amount of information they observe and the underlying uncertainty. We use the term 
conjectured experiment to denote the subject’s beliefs about the design of the exper-
iment. We study the impacts of two types of conjectured experiments: one in which 
the amount of information is perceived independent of any realized uncertainty and 
another in which the amount of information can be correlated (in an arbitrary man-
ner) with the realized uncertainty.
We emphasize that in experiments of decision making under uncertainty, the 
amount of information per se is usually independent of the actual state and the sig-
nals’ realizations. There are many reasons why a subject’s conjecture may not coin-
cide with the actual experimental design. For instance, subjects may arrive at the lab 
with real-world recipes of behavior that affect their interpretation of experimental 
instructions; they may also misunderstand the notion of independence, or theorize 
about the experimenter’s goals and selective choice of information (see Friedman 
and Sunder 1994; Kagel and Roth 1997; and Zizzo 2010). Subjects’ conjectures do 
not necessarily reflect suspicions regarding how the experiment is carried out.4
We assume subjects report to the experimenter the state they view as most likely. 
This is a natural starting point for our analysis since looking at reports of the most 
likely state requires the subject to go through very simple calculations that do not 
require expected utility maximization. The entire analysis here is based on ordi-
nal utilities (a monotonic transformation of the subject’s utility will not change her 
optimal response). In particular, the analysis is not sensitive to subjects’ risk pref-
erences. In contrast, in order to elicit the full beliefs a subject holds, choosing the 
proper utility would require certain behavioral assumptions, e.g., a quadratic scoring 
rule combined with maximization of expected utility.
Suppose first that subjects’ conjectured experiments are restricted so that the 
amount of information revealed to them is independent of both the realized state and 
4 Indeed, most economic experiments are preceded by a set of instructions, and the prevailing norm in the pro-















Figure 2. Reversal Not Explained by a Partially Restricted Conjectured Experiment
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the realized signals. In that case, there is a natural restriction on subjects’ reports for 
them to be consistent with Bayesian updating (generalizing our introductory exam-
ple). Indeed, Theorem 1 shows that a subject is Bayesian if and only if the following 
condition holds: the subject chooses the action  a for signal sequence  s whenever all 
continuation signal sequences lead her to choose  a .5
The other polar case of subjects’ conjectures occurs when no restrictions are put 
and subjects’ conjectures are allowed to entail correlations between the realization 
of all uncertainty (on the state and signals) and the number of signals observed; sub-
jects are free to frame the experiment however way they like. In that case, in line with 
the example above, Theorem 2 illustrates an “anything goes” result: any responses 
of subjects can be explained as arising from a particular conjectured experiment and 
Bayesian updating of the released information. In other words, in that case the theo-
retical predictions have no bite once jointly tested with the conjectured experiment.
From a positive and prescriptive point of view, certain experimental protocols are 
likely to place restrictions on the conjectures subjects hold. For instance, in many 
voting experiments, the number of signals is determined at the outset, but subjects 
produce their own signals, e.g., by drawing a ball from a physical urn (the compo-
sition of which represents the underlying state), during the experiment.6 In terms of 
the subjects’ conjectures, such designs are likely to entail independence between the 
realized signals and the number of signals provided.
In Section IV we study the intermediate case in which subjects’ conjectures allow 
for correlations between the amount of information revealed and the realized state, 
but the amount of information is independent of the signal realizations. Such par-
tially restricted conjectures allow for the volume of information to be associated with 
the state realization. Theorem 3 generalizes the example corresponding to Figure 2 
and provides a characterization of the class of reversals that violate Bayesian updat-
ing when subjects hold partially restricted conjectures. Much as in the example, 
the reversals that are consistent with Bayesian updating are roughly described as 
going “in the same direction” (or tending to a specific report) for a particular length 
of signal sequence. The theorem provides the tools for deducing departures from 
Bayesian updating when the signal generation process is transparent in the lab.
The underlying assumption in our analysis is that there is a natural sequencing of 
signals. This is why the experimental design is captured by the number of signals 
reported to the subject. This assumption is applicable in many situations (indeed, 
any context in which signals are tied with time), and eases the presentation. In the 
online Appendix we provide a similar analysis for environments in which there is 
no natural ordering of signals and a general conjectured experiment pertains to the 
dimensions of information that are reported (or which elements of the set of signals 
are reported) and their correlation with the underlying uncertainty.7
5 This is reminiscent of the “Sure Thing Principle” à la Savage (1954) and dynamic consistency. However, the 
experimental observations are mappings from sequences of signals. Thus, they contain a subset of elements consid-
ered by the Savage (1954) type of analysis. In particular, the sufficiency of the condition cannot be deduced from 
the work on foundations of expected utility. We elaborate on this point in Section II. 
6 See Palfrey (2006) for a description of various experiments on voting behavior. 
7 Our “anything goes” result still holds when conjectured experiments are unrestricted. However, the impli-
cations imposed by the natural analogue of restricted conjectured experiments do not carry through. In fact, we 
identify stronger observational restrictions that are in the spirit of “Dutch books.” Experimental observations can be 
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As mentioned, our analysis is very closely related to the unformalized notion of 
experimenter demand, the idea that the design itself makes subjects (consciously 
or subconsciously) frame the problem at hand in a particular way that makes them 
believe certain responses are more appropriate than others (see, e.g., Friedman and 
Sunder 1994; Kagel and Roth 1997; and Zizzo 2010). Experimenter demand type 
of arguments broadly take one of two forms. The first suggests that the way the 
experimenter phrases problems indicates something to the subject about the real-
ized uncertainty and the correct response. The second refers to the subject trying to 
“help” or “satisfy” the experimenter by aiming at the answers the experimenter is 
seeking. Our approach provides a first step in formalizing the former manifestation 
of experimenter demand, by contemplating a large class of conjectures, or ways to 
frame the experimental design. It is a necessary step for future models of the second 
demand manifestation as well, which potentially requires more behavioral and stra-
tegic assumptions on both experimenter and subject.
The idea that individuals may exhibit a variety of nonstandard behaviors in the 
presence of uncertainty, such as excess stickiness of beliefs, overconfidence, etc., 
has received much attention in both psychology and economics (see, for exam-
ple, Part 1 in Brocas and Carrillo 2004; Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982; and 
Nisbett and Ross 1980).8 The economics literature has taken two approaches for 
utilizing these observations:
 (i) Suggest alternative models of belief updating to that prescribed by Bayes’ 
rule (e.g., Rabin and Schrag 1999 and Compte and Postlewaite 2004);
 (ii) Modify subjects’ utilities to account for arguments going beyond pure mone-
tary rewards and directly depending on held beliefs (e.g., Bénabou and Tirole 
2002; Part 3 in Brocas and Carrillo 2003; Köszegi 2006; Yariv 2005, and 
references therein).
Our approach is very different in that we fix utilities and the belief updating 
algorithm, but allow for a wide range of theories subjects hold on the design of 
the experiment itself.9 The analysis of this paper does not propose a particular 
model describing subjects’ behavior. Rather, it focuses on the testable implications 
of existing (standard) models. In particular, it suggests the class of circumstances 
under which new descriptive models may be useful.
explained if and only if, after observing the subjects’ responses, the experimenter cannot design a sequence of bets 
that would lead the agent to lose money for sure. 
8 In fact, some work suggests that certain biases in probability assessments are associated with mental health: 
see Taylor and Brown (1988). 
9 There is an old and wide literature going back to Savage (1954) and Anscombe and Aumann (1963) that 
considers the question of when experimental observations match some form of optimization (allowing utilities 
to be arbitrary) together with standard probabilistic assessments/updating, essentially restricting the conjectured 
experiment to coincide with the actual design (for recent references, see Green and Park 1996). 
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I. Description of the Model
A. Setup
Let  A be a finite set of alternatives or states and  S a finite set of  signals . Let  N be 
the number of available signals and   = {0, 1, … , N} . We denote by  S ⩽N the set of 
all instances, i.e., sequences of elements of  S of length no greater than  N , including 
the empty sequence  e :
  S ⩽N =  ∪ 
0≤n≤N S n . 
Experimental observations are summarized by a mapping  σ :  S ⩽N → A . For 
every signal sequence  s ,  σ (s) is the subject’s report of the most probable alternative 
given  s .10 The reason for focusing on these sorts of reports is that we want to iden-
tify behaviors that cannot be rationalized by means that are not related to experi-
mental demand (for instance, via risk aversion). Reports of the most likely state are 
not sensitive to the shape of a subject’s utility (in particular, his/her risk attitudes).
For  x =  ( s 1 , … ,  s N ) ∈  S N and  1 ≤ n ≤ N , let  x |  n be the truncation of  x to 
the first  n signals:  x |  n =  ( s 1 , … ,  s n ) .
If  s = ( s 1 , … ,  s n ) is an instance and  s ∈ S we denote by  sˆs the concatenation 
of  s with  s :  sˆs = ( s 1 , … ,  s n , s) .
The set  S ⩽N of instances has a natural rooted tree structure: the root is the empty 
sequence, the depth  d (s) of an instance  s = ( s 1 , … ,  s n ) is  d (s) = n and the chil-
dren of  s are instances of the form  sˆs for  s ∈ S . The  n th layer of the tree is the 
set of nodes of depth  n . Technically, all our results and proofs depend only on the 
rooted tree structure of the set of instances. In particular, the results remain true if 
the number of available signals is infinite.
B. Conjectured Experiments
We consider subjects who hold beliefs regarding the experimental procedures, 
namely about the link between the signals they observe and the underlying realized 
alternative (and their preferred action). We call such a belief a conjectured experi-
ment, defined formally as:
DEFINITION 1 (Conjectured Experiment): A conjectured experiment is given by 
a triplet  (α, τ, ζ =  { ζ n } 1≤n≤N ) of random variables over some probability space (Ω, , P) with values in  A, ,  S ≤N , respectively.
The random variable  α denotes the conjecture about the set of alternatives  A ,  τ 
stands for the length of the observed signal sequence that, therefore, takes values 
10 Our primitive, the experimental observations, or the mapping from all possible signal collections to alterna-
tives chosen, is reminiscent of what is observed in experiments utilizing the strategy method, an experimental pro-
cedure dating back to Selten (1967) under which subjects report contingent choices, thereby eliciting their preferred 
alternatives for any observed realization of uncertainty in the lab. 
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in   , and  ζ captures the random variables corresponding to the realization of any 
signal sequence.11
Our results inspect the impacts of different restrictions on the conjectured exper-
iment (that are consequences of either the transparency of the experimental design, 
or the subjective interpretations of subjects).12
In Definition 1 we pose no restrictions on the dependence between the variables 
α, τ, and  ζ . To emphasize this fact we will often refer to such a conjectured experi-
ment as an unrestricted conjectured experiment.
In particular, the opposite polar case to that of an unrestricted conjectured experi-
ment is a restricted conjectured experiment in which the subject believes the number 
of signals she sees is uncorrelated with neither the realized alternative nor with the 
realization of the signals themselves. This is the case, for example, when the subject 
believes that the experimenter does not know both the realized alternative and real-
ized signals when determining how many signals to provide. Formally,
DEFINITION 2 (Restricted Conjectured Experiment): A restricted conjectured 
experiment is a conjectured experiment  (α, τ, ζ) such that  τ is independent of the 
pair  (α, ζ) .
We are interested in conjectured experiments—structures of information with 
which the subject interprets observations—that explain a subject’s behavior as aris-
ing from Bayesian updating given the number of signals available to her and their 
realizations. That is,
DEFINITION 3 (Explaining Observations): A conjectured experiment  (α, τ, ζ =  { ζ n } 1≤n≤N ) explains the experimental observations  σ if:
 (i) for every  n ∈  and every  s 1 , … ,  s n ∈ S ,
  P (τ = n,  ζ i =  s i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n) > 0 .
 (ii) For every instance  s =  ( s 1 , … ,  s n ) ,
(1)  σ (s) =  arg max 
a∈A
   P (α = a | τ = n,  ζ i =  s i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n) . 
Here and elsewhere, when we use the  arg max notation, we implicitly assert the 
uniqueness of the maximizer.13
11 Note that the set  A of alternatives, the number  N of signals, and the set  S from which signals are drawn are 
fixed. The only element of the experimental design about which the subject conjectures regards the distribution 
over  A, N, and  S N . 
12 Throughout, we assume a natural sequencing of signals. This assumption is applicable in most economics 
experiments (for instance, it holds whenever signals are provided in sequence) and eases the presentation. In the 
online Appendix we analyze environments in which there is no natural ordering of signals and a general conjectured 
experiment pertains to the dimensions of information reported. 
13 In principle, we could also assume that  σ is a correspondence. In that case,  σ (s) would stand for the set of 
all alternatives the agent views as most likely after a sequence  s of observations. If we assume that the set  σ (s) is 
observed after every sequence  s and modify Definition 3 accordingly then our main results continue to hold, but 
notation becomes cumbersome. If, on the other hand, we assume that only one alternative in  σ (s) is observed (which 
is the case in an experiment, where the subject has to select one alternative), then any observations can be trivially 
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The first condition in the definition requires that every finite sequence of signals 
the subject is faced with is indeed conceivable (has positive probability) under her 
conjectured experiment.14
The second condition requires that under the conjectured experiment, the subject 
(Bayesian) updates on which alternative is most likely, conditioning on the signals 
she receives, and selects that alternative.
We note that the signals in our framework have no content per se. We chose this 
setting since we want to focus on how different assumptions about the role of the 
experimenter in providing those signals might affect a subject’s behavior, rather 
than inspect subjects’ beliefs about how signals are generated for any alternative. 
For this reason, we give the subject as much freedom as possible in interpreting 
the signals, and we show that, even with this freedom, there is a gap between the 
behaviors that can be explained under different assumptions on the experimenter’s 
role. Nonetheless, often signals are associated with a natural interpretation and it is 
reasonable to restrict subjects’ conjectures to particular plausible ones. In the online 
Appendix we detail instances of two types of such plausible conjectures: condition-
ally i.i.d. and conditionally exchangeable.
II. Restricted Conjectured Experiments
We start with the case in which subjects’ conjectures are restricted. That is, sub-
jects believe that the amount of information they observe is independent of the real-
ized alternative and the realized signals. In that case, conjectured experiments can 
be written in a simplified manner.
REMARK 1 (Restricted Conjectures, Simplified Notation): If  τ is independent of 
the pair  (ζ, α) then (1) becomes
(2)  σ (s) =  arg max 
a∈A
   P (α = a |  ζ i =  s i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n) .
Thus, a restricted conjectured experiment that explains the experimental observa-
tions is identified by a pair  (α, ζ) of random variables with values in  A,  S N such that 
(2) is satisfied.
Let  s be an instance and suppose that no matter what additional signal  s ∈ S 
is observed, the subject reports the alternative  a ∗ to be the most likely. That is, 
σ (sˆs) =  a ∗ for every  s ∈ S. If the subject is updating using Bayes rule, with a 
restricted conjecture, she cannot deduce anything regarding the realized state by the 
sheer volume of signals she observes. Thus, her assessment of each realized alter-
native under  s is a convex combination of the corresponding assessments over all 
rationalized if we assume that the subject believes that all alternatives are equally likely and that the signals are 
independent of the alternatives. 
14 The Bayesian paradigm is silent on what should happen when a Bayesian agent observes a sequence of sig-
nals to which she attaches probability zero. Since we want to perform our analysis completely within the Bayesian 
paradigm, we assume that this cannot happen. Without imposing this assumption, we would have to pose an ad hoc 
alternative assumption about what a Bayesian agent should do when facing a zero-probability event. 
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 continuations  sˆs . In particular, the most likely alternative must be  a ∗ . This suggests 
a clear necessary requirement for observations to be explained. Theorem 1 illus-
trates that this requirement is, in fact, also sufficient. That is,
THEOREM 1 (Restricted Conjectured Experiments): The experimental observa-
tions  σ can be explained by a restricted conjectured experiment if and only if the 
following condition is satisfied: 
 Let  s be an instance. If, for some  a ∗ ∈ A , one has  σ (sˆs) =  a ∗ for every  s ∈ S , 
then  σ (s) =  a ∗ .
The idea underlying the proof of the theorem is instructive for some of the future 
analysis in the paper. While some details appear in the Appendix, we stress that 
illustrating the sufficiency of the requirement is done in two steps. First, we con-
sider an auxiliary (and hypothetical) experiment in which subjects report full pos-
teriors over states for every instance (generating a mapping from  S ⩽N to  ∆ (A) ) and 
identify the responses consistent with Bayes’ rule. Second, for any experimental 
observations satisfying the requirement of Theorem 1, we construct recursively a 
set of posteriors satisfying these identified restrictions that are consistent with the 
experimental observations.15
The first step, then, is captured by the following lemma, which addresses the 
question of which assignments of posterior distributions over states of nature can 
be explained.
LEMMA 1 (Explainable Posteriors, Restricted): For every instance  s ∈  S ⩽N , 
let  p s ∈ ∆ (A) . Then there exist random variables  {α, ζ} over some probability space (Ω, , P) with values in  A,  S N respectively such that:
 (i)  P ( ζ 1 =  s 1 , … ,  ζ N =  s N ) > 0 for every  ( s 1 , … ,  s N ) ∈  S N ; and
 (ii) For every instance  s = ( s 1 , … ,  s n ) and every  a ∈ A 
(3)  P {α = a |  ζ i =  s i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n} =  p s [a] 
if and only if for every  n < N and every  s = ( s 1 , … ,  s n ) one has16
(4)  p s ∈ ri (Conv {  p sˆs | s ∈ S} ) .
The proof of the lemma appears in the Appendix. The lemma effectively pro-
vides the testable implications of Bayesian updating. It suggests that an individ-
ual is Bayesian if and only if the following holds: the probability distribution that 
15 The assumption that the subject is Bayesian is important for Theorem 1. For instance, were we to use a 
multiple prior updating rule à la Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993), one can show that any experimental observations 
could be rationalized. 
16 The relative interior  ri (C) of a convex set  C in finite dimensional real vector space is the interior of  C with 
respect to the smallest affine space that contains  C . If  F is a finite set of points then  ri (ConvF) is given by the set of 
all convex combinations of elements of  F with strictly positive coefficients,
 ri (ConvF) =  { ∑ v∈F 
 
  λ v v |  λ v > 0 ∀v ∈ F and  ∑ 
v∈F
 
  λ v = 1} . 
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 represents the agent’s belief after observing any finite sequence of signals is a con-
vex combination of the probability distributions that represent her beliefs condi-
tional on observing sequences of signals that are the possible continuations of the 
original sequence.
It is interesting to note that the lemma implies that a large class of updating 
rules that exhibit stickiness to prior beliefs (i.e., rules in which the reported beliefs 
are always tilted toward previous reports) is observationally equivalent to Bayesian 
updating. Indeed, assume for simplicity that the subject believes that signals are 
conditionally independent and identically distributed given the state, and calculates 
the posteriors  p s after observing signals  s = ( s 1 , … ,  s n ) as follows:
  p s [a] = α ·   p s | n−1 [a]ρ ( s n | a)  _________________  
 ∑ b∈A   p s | n−1 [b]ρ ( s n | b) + (1 − α)  p s | n−1 [a],
where  0 < α < 1 and  0 < ρ (s | a) < 1 for every state  a and signal  s , 
and  s  | n−1 = ( s 1 , … ,  s n−1 ) .
That is, the agent weighs the correct posterior with her previous prediction. It is 
straightforward to show that  p s would, in fact, satisfy the lemma’s condition. In par-
ticular, it would be indistinguishable from Bayesian updating (with a prior different 
than  3 ).
As a technical note, the relative interior  ri appearing in condition (4) assures that 
there is positive weight on any instance observed, which will be useful for construct-
ing conjectured experiments that entail this type of restriction. Simply requiring 
 p s ∈ Conv{  p sˆs | s ∈ S} would correspond to consistent posterior reports, but ones 
that may place zero probability on certain instances.
We are now ready to present the proof of Theorem 1.
PROOF OF THEOREM 1:
It follows directly from Lemma 1 that the experimental observations  σ :  S ⩽N → A 
that can be explained by restricted conjectured experiments must satisfy the condi-
tion in Theorem 1. Indeed, let  (α, τ, ζ) be a restricted conjectured experiment that 
explains  σ , and let
  p s [a] = P (α = a |  ζ i =  s i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n) . 
From (2),  σ (s) =arg  max a   p s [a] , and from Lemma 1 we get that  p s satisfies (4). 
Assume that for some instance  s and some  a ∗ ∈ A one has  σ (sˆs) =  a ∗ for 
every  s ∈ S . Then it follows that  arg  max a   p sˆs [a] =  a ∗ for every  s . Therefore, 
 σ (s) = arg max a   p s [a] =  a ∗ , where the last equality follows from the previous 
equality and (4).
To prove the other direction, we start with experimental observations that satisfy 
the condition of Theorem 1 and construct posterior distributions  p s for every instance 
s such that (4) is satisfied and, in addition,  σ (s) = arg  max a   p s [a] for every  s .
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We use the following additional lemma:
LEMMA 2 (One Period Construction): Let  ∆ ∗ (A) =  {p ∈ ∆ (A) | p [a] <  1 _ | A | −1
for every a ∈ A} and let  p ∈  ∆ ∗ (A) . Suppose  a 1 , … ,  a m ∈ A are such that 
either  a i ≠  a j for some  1 ≤ i, j ≤ m , or  a 1 = ⋯ =  a m = arg max p . Then 
there exists  p 1 , … ,  p m ∈  ∆ ∗ (A) such that  p ∈ ri (Conv {  p 1 , … ,  p m } ) and 
arg max  p i =  a i .
The proof of Lemma 2 is technical and is deferred to the Appendix. It follows 
from the lemma that we can inductively assign posterior probabilities  p s ∈  ∆ ∗ (A) 
for every instance  s such that (4) is satisfied and, in addition,
(5)  arg max 
a
    p s [a] = σ (a) 
for every instance  s (indeed, assuming we already defined  p s , we define  p sˆS using 
the lemma, with  m = | S | ). By Lemma 1 there exists random variables  α, ζ over 
some probability space with values in  A,  S N , respectively, such that  ζ has full sup-
port and (3) is satisfied. Let  τ be some random variable with values in   , inde-
pendent of  (α, ζ) , whose distribution has full support. Then for every  a ∈ A and 
s =  ( s 1 , … ,  s n ) ∈  S ⩽N ,
   P (α = a | τ = n,  ζ 1 =  s 1 , … ,  ζ n =  s n ) 
    = P (α = a |  ζ 1 =  s 1 , … ,  ζ n =  s n ) =  p s [a] .
By (5) and the last equation it follows that  (α, ζ, τ) explains  σ , as desired.  ∎ 
Since the proof that the condition in Theorem 1 is necessary was based solely on 
(2), it bears on a larger set of conjectures that allow for some correlation between 
the volume of information and the realization of signals. Indeed, let us say that a 
conjectured experiment  (α, τ, ζ) is adapted if
   P (τ = n | α = a,  ζ 1 =  s 1 , … ,  ζ N =  s N ) 
    = P (τ = n |  ζ 1 =  s 1 , … ,  ζ n =  s n ) , 
for every  n ∈  ,  a ∈ A , and  s 1 , … ,  s N ∈ S (see Prokhorov and Shiryaev 
1997, p. 113 for a general definition of adaptable stopping times). This means 
that when the experimenter decides whether to continue providing signals after 
stage  n , he can base his decision upon the already released signals  s 1 , … ,  s n (which 
were observed by the subject). Importantly, every restricted conjectured experiment 
is adapted.
It is easy to verify that (2) is still valid for adapted conjectured experiments. 
Therefore, even though the set of adapted conjectured experiments is larger than the 
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set of restricted conjectured experiments, both sets of conjectured experiments have 
the same explanatory power and we get the following corollary:
COROLLARY 1 (Adapted Conjectured Experiments): If experimental observa-
tions can be explained by an adapted conjectured experiment then they can also be 
explained by a restricted conjectured experiment.
In particular, the Corollary implies that allowing subjects to conjecture that the 
experimenter provides information using a sequential procedure, one in which the 
experimenter decides whether or not to provide an additional signal depending on 
the signals that have been revealed thus far, leads to the same testable implications 
described in Theorem 1.
The Sure Thing Principle and Dynamic Consistency.—The condition of 
Theorem 1 is reminiscent of the “Sure Thing Principle” and the notion of dynamic 
consistency. Dynamic consistency suggests that if the decision maker knows that 
given additional information tomorrow she will prefer action  a to  b regardless of 
what that information will be, then she should prefer  a to  b today (see, e.g., Epstein 
and Le Breton 1993; Ghirardato 2002, and references therein; as well as Savage 
1954). Note, however, that while the condition in Theorem 1 is expressed solely 
in terms of the maximal element within the agent’s conditional beliefs, dynamic 
consistency is a property of a preference relation over contingent plans. Moreover, 
our primitive  σ determines only the subject’s action conditioned on a certain class 
of events, i.e., events that are given by the assignment of values to certain sets of 
signals. The condition of the theorem is therefore weaker than dynamic consistency: 
if the order induced by observations  σ over actions can be extended to an order over 
contingent plans that satisfies dynamic consistency, then  σ must satisfy the condi-
tion. The Theorem implies that the converse is also true: if  σ satisfies the condition, 
then it can be explained by Bayesian updating, and therefore it can be extended to an 
order over contingent plans that satisfies dynamic consistency. We emphasize that 
the sufficiency part of Theorem 1 cannot be derived from results regarding dynamic 
consistency. In fact, without imposing the fixed ordering of signals (thereby allow-
ing information to be provided via arbitrary sets of signals), the condition of the 
theorem is not sufficient for the observations to be explained by a restricted conjec-
tured experiment. As mentioned, we provide an analysis of this more general setup 
in the online Appendix.
Generating Restricted Conjectures in the Lab.—While it is difficult to control the 
subjective beliefs of subjects in the lab, some experiments are more likely to induce 
restricted conjectures by specifying the number of signals subjects will observe at 
the outset and later determining both the state and the signals in a transparent man-
ner. We mention two examples that match our setting particularly well.
The first has to do with the formation of herd behavior in the lab. For instance, 
in the classic experiments of Anderson and Holt (1997), the original cascade model 
of Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992) was tested. In the main treatment, 
there were six subjects in each session, one of which was randomly designated as 
the “monitor” and helped the experimenters generate the uncertainty and signals in 
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the experiment. In each of  15 periods, the monitor used a die to determine which of 
two urns would be used for that period. Urn A contained two “a” balls and one “b” 
ball, and urn B contained two “b” balls and one “a” ball. Urn A was used if the throw 
of the die was 1, 2, or 3; urn B was used otherwise. Subjects were randomly ordered 
and each saw one private draw from the selected urn. After seeing their private draw, 
each subject had to guess which urn was selected. This guess was then announced 
to other subjects. In this way, each subject knew his or her own private draw and the 
prior decisions of others, if any, before making a guess. This process continued until 
all subjects had made guesses. At the end of each period, the monitor announced 
which urn had been selected and each subject was paid  $2 if their guess was correct 
and nothing otherwise. In this design, the number of signals was determined at the 
outset and one of the subjects, the “monitor,” helped assure subjects the experiment-
ers did not release information selectively. Furthermore, as in our theoretical setting, 
it was in the best interest of the subjects to report the alternative, which urn had been 
selected, they thought was more likely.17
The results suggested about one-half as many reverse cascades as there were 
normal cascades that theory predicts with Bayesian updating based on the underly-
ing uncertainty and equilibrium behavior. The authors suggested a model of errors, 
which is consistent with subjects relying more on their own private information. 
However, they also noted that about one-third of their subjects seem to rely on a 
simple count of signals, which is consistent with Bayesian updating with a different 
information generation process (e.g., one in which each preceding subject’s guess 
reflects their private draw and is not impacted by previous guesses).
The second example of an experiment that fits our restricted conjectures setting 
is provided by the recent work of Möbius et al. (2014), who look at the evolution of 
subjects’ beliefs about being among the top half of performers in an IQ quiz. At the 
outset, subjects responded to an IQ quiz. Their beliefs about being among the top 
half of performers were elicited after the quiz. There were then four stages, which 
were announced at the outset. At each stage, each subject initially received a binary 
signal that indicated whether the subject was among the top half of performers; that 
signal was correct with 75 percent probability. Subjects then reported their belief 
about being among the top half of performers. That is, subjects received four con-
ditionally independent signals that depended on their own performance and others’. 
Since both the realized state and the signals were generated by the subjects them-
selves, this design was likely to induce restricted conjectures.
The results illustrate that subjects over-weigh positive feedback relative to nega-
tive feedback and are conservative—they have sticky beliefs in that they update too 
little in response to both positive and negative feedback. The authors suggest, in line 
with our results, that subjects update as if they misinterpret signal distributions in a 
self-serving manner, but process these modified signals using Bayes’ rule.
We now turn to analyze the testable implications derived when conjectured exper-
iments are fully unrestricted.
17 The use of subjects as “monitors” may be a useful way to restrict subjects’ conjectures and appears in several 
other experimental designs. For another experiment in the context of Bayesian updating, see El-Gamal and Grether (1995). 
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III. Unrestricted Conjectured Experiments
When conjectured experiments are unrestricted, the amount of information 
observed can be perceived as correlated with the realization of uncertainty. The 
requirement appearing in Theorem 1 is then too strong. As an example, consider 
the classical experiment of Tversky and Kahneman (1983). In their experiment, 
subjects were told that “Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. 
She majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues 
of discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear demon-
strations.” Subjects were then asked to determine which is more likely: 1. Linda is 
a bank teller; or 2. Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement. 
Eighty-five percent of the subjects chose the second option. This was taken as evi-
dence for the failure of conjunction of probabilities. However, a different interpre-
tation is that the mere fact the experimenter chose to expose Linda’s participation 
in demonstrations suggests that 2 is the appropriate answer. In other words, the 
information revealed (captured by the details appearing in the blurb describing 
Linda) could be perceived to be correlated with the underlying state (which answer 
the experimenter expects). In fact, many experiments falling under the general 
rubric of the Representative Heuristic (see Tversky and Kahneman 1974) have 
this feature of a scenario, or a person’s profile, that is described in some detail and 
followed by a classification query.
The following is an example in the same spirit utilizing our notation:
Example 1 (Explanatory Power of Unrestricted Conjectures): Assume 
that  N = 1 , S =  {u, d} , A = {a, b} , and consider the experimental observations 
σ given by
  σ (e) = a and σ (u) = σ (d ) = b ,
as depicted in tree form in panel C of Figure 1. Note that the condition of Theorem 1 
is not satisfied, and therefore  σ cannot be explained by a restricted conjectured 
experiment. However,  σ can be explained by an unrestricted conjectured experiment (α, τ, ζ) such that  τ and  ζ are independent conditional on the realized alternative  α 
and, in addition, characterized by the following:
  P (α = a) = P (α = b) =  1 _
2
 P (τ  =0 | α = a) = 1 − P (τ = 1 | α = a) = 0.9
 P (τ = 0 | α = b) = 1 − P (τ = 1 | α = b) = 0.1
 P (ζ = u | α =  a ̃) = P (ζ = d | α =  a ̃) = 0.5 for every  a ̃ ∈ {a, b} . 
As explained in the paper’s introductory example, the conjectured experiment 
is such that when the realized alternative is  α = a , the subject perceives receiving 
no signals as extremely likely, whereas when the realized alternative is  α = b , the 
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subject perceives receiving a signal as very likely. However, the determination of the 
number of signals observed is done independently of the generation of the signals 
themselves. In fact, the signals in and of themselves are uninformative.
It turns out that any experimental observations can be explained with an unre-
stricted conjectured experiment, formally captured in the following “anything goes” 
result:
THEOREM 2 (Unrestricted Conjectured Experiments): For every  σ :  S ⩽N → A the 
experimental observations  σ admit an explanation by an unrestricted conjectured 
experiment.
From the theorem, when subjects’ conjectures are unconstrained, anomalous 
updating behavior is indistinguishable from particular framing of the experimental 
design itself.
The proof of Theorem 2, as the proof of Theorem 1, follows two steps. We first 
show that any set of posteriors can be explained with an unrestricted conjectured 
experiment. This is the crucial step in the proof, since it is then immediate to choose 
a sequence of posteriors that is consistent with the observations, and therefore ratio-
nalizes them with an unrestricted conjecture. Formally, the analogue of Lemma 1 is 
the following:
LEMMA 3 (Explainable Posteriors, Unrestricted): Let  p s ∈ ∆(A) be an assign-
ment of probability distribution over  A for every instance  s ∈  S ⩽N . Then there exist 
random variables  (α, τ, ζ) over some probability space  (Ω, , P) , with values in 
A, ,  S N respectively, such that
 (i) for every  n ∈  and every  s 1 , … ,  s n ∈ S ,
  P (τ = n,  ζ i =  s i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n) > 0; 
 (ii) For every instance  s =  ( s 1 , … ,  s n ) and every  a ∈ A 
(6)  P (α = a | τ = n,  ζ i =  s i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n) =  p s [a] . 
The lemma is conceptually important in that it highlights how robust the message 
of Theorem 2 is to what is elicited by the experimenter when subjects’ conjectures 
are unrestricted. Indeed, even if for each instance the full belief were elicited (instead 
of the most likely state), Lemma 3 assures that an analogous “anything goes” result 
would still hold and any experimental observations (now entailing posterior beliefs 
for all instances) could be explained with an unrestricted conjecture.
The proof of Lemma 3, appearing in the Appendix, is at the root of our “anything 
goes” result. Intuitively, an unrestricted conjectured experiment ultimately corre-
sponds to a joint distribution  3 over  A ×  ×  S N . For any assignment of posteri-
ors  { p s } s∈ S ⩽N  ,  p s ∈ ∆ (A) , pick an arbitrary distribution  ν over   ×  S N and define 3 as
  3 (k, n,  s 1 , … ,  s N ) = ν  (n,  s 1 , … ,  s N )  p  ( s 1 , … , s N )  [a] . 
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Then, the conditional distribution of  3 given the number of signals  n and full reali-
zation  ( s 1 , … ,  s N ) is  p  ( s 1 , … ,  s N )  . It follows that the conditional distribution of  3 given 
n and  ( s 1 , … ,  s n ) is  p s , where  s =  ( s 1 , … ,  s n ) , as required. The proof of Theorem 2 
now follows immediately:
PROOF OF THEOREM 2: 
For experimental observations  σ :  S ⩽N → A we choose arbitrarily, for every 
instance  s ∈  S ⩽N , a probability distribution  p s ∈ ∆(A) such that  arg  max a   p s [a] = σ (s) . The corresponding random variables  α, τ, and  ζ, whose existence is asserted 
in Lemma 3, explain  σ . ∎ 
Aggregate Data.—Theorems 1 and 2 pin down the testable implications of 
restricted and unrestricted conjectured experiments when we observe the response 
of a single subject after every sequence of signals. In practice, experimenters usually 
work with aggregate data from responses of a random sample of subjects, each of 
whom has responded only to some sequences of signals.
Suppose each subject is asked to make a decision after a single signal sequence  s . 
Theorem 1 can be used to deduce the testable implications of such data, assuming 
the hypothetical (unobserved) responses of every subject are rationalized by some 
conjectured experiment (though not necessarily the same conjecture for every sub-
ject). In the online Appendix we provide a detailed model of such a setting. Here, 
assume, for example, that  A = {a, b} and  S = {u, d} and, for every sequence  s 
of signals, let  θ (s) be the proportion of subjects who pick  a when provided with 
the signal sequence  s. Assume further that each of these subjects responds to the 
experimental queries using a function  σ :  S ⩽N → A that can be rationalized by some 
restricted conjectured experiment (i.e., satisfies the condition of Theorem 1). Then, 
it must be the case that  θ (s) ⩽ θ (sˆu) + θ (sˆd) ⩽ θ (s) + 1 for every  s ∈  S N . 
Indeed,  θ (s) ≤ θ (sˆu) + θ (sˆd) since every subject who chooses  a after  s must be 
either among the subjects who would choose  a after  sˆu or among the subjects who 
would choose  a after  sˆd. Similarly,  1 − θ (s) ≤ (1 − θ (sˆu)) + (1 − θ (sˆd)) (or, 
equivalently,  θ (sˆu) + θ (sˆd) ≤ θ (s) + 1 ) since every subject who chooses  b after 
s must be either among the subjects who would choose  b after  sˆu or among the 
subjects who would choose  b after  sˆd. 
We can estimate  θ (s) from the sample. Statistically significant violations of 
this inequality will therefore refute the hypothesis that subjects respond accord-
ing to some restricted conjectured experiment. On the other hand, it follows from 
Theorem 2 that every distribution of subjects’ responses can be rationalized as the 
aggregation of responses of subjects associated with some unrestricted conjectured 
experiment.
To summarize our results up to now, we have characterized the testable impli-
cations of Bayesian updating for two polar cases pertaining to subjects’ freedom 
regarding the framing of the experimental design. When conjectures are fully 
restricted, standard updating is equivalent to a type of dynamic consistency condi-
tion. When conjectures are unrestricted, standard updating has no testable implica-
tions. In what follows, we analyze testable implications derived from intermediate 
restrictions.
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IV. Partially Restricted Conjectured Experiments
In this section, we consider intermediate restrictions that may correspond to 
experimental designs in which signals (but not states) are determined in the lab in 
front of the subjects (and the number of signals is a design choice). Indeed, many 
of the recent social learning and voting experiments follow protocols of this nature. 
In these experiments, two uncertain alternatives are often manifested in two jars 
that contain a majority of either, say, red or blue balls. Subjects, not knowing which 
jar had been selected can then draw a predetermined number of balls, often with 
replacement, from the chosen jar and observe their color18 (for a survey of such 
experiments, see Palfrey 2006, forthcoming).
With such designs, it is natural to assume the subject believes the number of 
signals she receives is uncorrelated with the realizations of the signals (but may be 
correlated with the realized alternative). We formalize such conjectures as follows:
DEFINITION 4 (Partially Restricted Conjectured Experiment): A partially restricted 
conjectured experiment is a conjectured experiment  (α, τ, ζ) such that  τ and  ζ are 
conditionally independent given  α , i.e.,
  P (τ = n, ζ = x | α = a) = P (τ = n | α = a) · P (ζ = x | α = a) , 
for every  n ∈  ,  x ∈  S N , and  a ∈ A .
We assume hereafter a binary state space,  A = {a, b} .19 Note that the conjecture 
proposed in Example 1 is partially restricted and so that example illustrates that the 
explanatory power of partially restricted conjectured experiments is larger than that 
of restricted conjectured experiments. However, not all experimental observations 
can be explained by a partially restricted conjectured experiment, as illustrated by 
the following example, formalizing the example we discussed in our introduction:
Example 2 (Unexplainable Reversals): Assume that  N = 2 ,  S = {u, d } , and 
consider the experimental observations  σ depicted in Figure 2. Let  s and  t be the 
signal sequences  ( u ) and  (d) respectively (so  d (s) = d (t) = 1 ). On the one 
hand, controlling for any learning from the sheer amount of information released, 
s is more supportive of the alternative  a than  t (from the subject’s point of view) 
since  σ (s) = a and  σ (t) = b . On the other hand, the same can be said in reverse, 
since conditioning on depth 2 of the tree,  σ (sˆs) = b and  σ (tˆt) = a for every 
s, t ∈ {u, d } . This inconsistency implies that the experimental observations cannot 
be explained by a partially restricted conjectured experiment.
Examples 1 and 2 illustrate that the explanatory power of partially restricted con-
jectured experiments is strictly between that of unrestricted and restricted conjec-
tured experiments.
18 Our framework encompasses such strategic interactions since we can always rename the alternatives appro-
priately. Namely, in strategic interaction experiments, subjects select the action (which serves as our alternative) 
that is more likely to deliver higher payoffs. 
19 Our characterization in this section relies on techniques tailored for a binary set of alternatives. While many 
experiments satisfy this restriction (for instance, much of the experimental literature on voting focuses on binary 
elections), we view the extension to richer sets of alternatives as an interesting direction for future research. 
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Our characterization of the class of observations that are explainable with par-
tially restricted conjectures entails ruling out a generalized set of reversals of the 
type appearing in Example 2. Roughly speaking, reversals that are consistent with 
Bayesian updating are described by “tending to a specific report” for a particular 
length of signal sequence.
Formally, fix experimental observations  σ . For a pair of instances  s, t of the 
same depth we define recursively what we mean by “the conditional probability of 
state ‘ a ’ given  s is behaviorally revealed higher than the conditional probability of 
state ‘ a ’ given  t, ” where the conditioning is on the value of signals received, but not 
their number. We say shortly that  s is revealed higher than  t .20
DEFINITION 5 (Revealed Higher Relation): Let  σ :  S ⩽N → {a, b} be experimental 
observations. For a pair of instances  s, t ∈  S ⩽N of the same depth the relation ‘ s 
is revealed higher than  t under  σ ’ is recursively defined using the following rules:
 (i) If  σ (s) = a and  σ (t) = b, then  s is revealed higher than  t .
 (ii) If  sˆs is revealed higher than  tˆt for every  s, t ∈ S , then  s is revealed higher 
than  t .
The following lemma illustrates the implication of one instance being revealed 
higher than another in terms of probabilistic assessments:
LEMMA 4 (Revealed Higher Probabilities): Let  σ :  S ⩽N → {a, b} be experimental 
observations, and let  (α, τ, ζ) be a partially restricted conjectured experiment that 
explains  σ . If  s = ( s 1 , … ,  s n ) and  t = ( t 1 , … ,  t n ) ∈  S ⩽N are a pair of instances 
such that  s is revealed higher than  t under  σ , then
  P (α = a |  ζ 1 =  s 1 , … ,  ζ n =  s n ) > P (α = a |  ζ 1 =  t 1 , … ,  ζ n =  t n ) .
Lemma 4 assures that if the experimental observations can be explained by a 
partially restricted conjectured experiment, it cannot be the case that there are rever-
sals of the form  s is revealed higher than  t and  t is revealed higher than  s for some 
instances  s and  t. As it turns out, the reverse is also true. Indeed, the following the-
orem characterizes the set of experimental observations that can be explained by a 
partially restricted conjectured experiment.
THEOREM 3 (Partially Restricted Conjectured Experiments): The experimental 
observations  σ :  S ⩽N → {a, b} can be explained by a partially restricted conjec-
tured experiment if and only if the order revealed higher is antisymmetric. That is, 
there exists no pair  s, t of instances such that  s is revealed higher than  t and  t is 
revealed higher than  s .
20 Note that “revealed higher” need not be a complete relation, nor is it necessarily antisymmetric. 
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The formal proof of the sufficiency of the condition is intricate and appears in the 
online Appendix, together with the formal proof of Lemma 4.
In order to provide the reader with some intuition, we present here a sketch of the 
proof of the theorem. Assume that the experimental observations  σ :  S ⩽N → {a, b} 
satisfy the theorem’s condition. We construct the partially restricted conjectured 
experiment  (α, τ, ζ) that explains  σ in two steps. First, we construct random vari-
ables  (α, ζ) such that
  P (α = a |  ζ 1 =  s 1 , … ,  ζ n =  s n ) > P (α = a |  ζ 1 =  t 1 , … ,  ζ n =  t n ) 
for every pair  s = ( s 1 , … ,  s n ) and  t = ( t 1 , … ,  t n ) of instances of the same length 
such that  σ (s) = a and  σ (t) = b . In the second step, we add a random variable 
τ that is independent of  ζ given  α and, for every  n , we choose the probabilities 
P (α = a | τ = n) so that
  P (α = a | τ = n,  ζ 1 =  s 1 , … ,  ζ n =  s n ) > 1/2 
for all instances  s = ( s 1 , … ,  s n ) such that  σ (s) = a and
  P (α = a | τ = n,  ζ 1 =  t 1 , … ,  ζ n =  t n ) < 1/2 
for all instances  t = ( t 1 , … ,  t n ) such that  σ (t) = b .
In words, we first construct conjectures that are consistent within each layer of 
the tree of observations (that is, for a fixed number of signals). We then construct the 
correlation between the number of signals observed and underlying state so that the 
assessments across layers are consistent.
The main difficulty is in the first stage. The proof makes use of the tree structure 
over the set of instances. For every instance  s = ( s 1 , … ,  s n ) ∈  S ⩽N we assign a 
number  p s ∈ [0, 1] such that  p s ∈ ri (Conv {  p sˆs | s ∈ S} ) and  p s >  p t whenever 
s, t are two instances of the same length and  s is revealed higher than  t . Then, by 
Lemma 1 we can construct random variables  α, ζ such that
  p s = P (α = a |  ζ 1 =  s 1 , … ,  ζ n =  s n ) 
for every instance  s = ( s 1 , … ,  s n ) .
We assign the numbers  p s to nodes  s by induction over the depth of  s , working 
from the root of the tree to the leafs. Assume that we have already defined the val-
ues  p s for nodes of depth  n − 1 and consider now the set  X of nodes of depth  n . 
The relation revealed higher induces a partial order over  X , which we denote by  ≤ . 
In addition, there is a natural partition   over the set  X , whose atoms are the set 
of instances with a common parent in the tree. Thus, the atoms of   correspond to 
nodes of depth  n − 1 . Since we have already defined  p s over these nodes, we need 
to “lift”  p to a function over  X that is monotone with respect to  ≤ . Much of the 
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 technical aspects of the proof are dedicated to showing that this is indeed possible, 
using the fact that the order “revealed higher” is an interval order.21
We note that Theorem 3 gives rise to a simple algorithm for checking whether 
experimental observations in a finite tree can be explained by a partially restricted 
conjectured experiment: go over all the layers of the tree of instances, from the 
layer of depth  d = N to the layer of depth  d = 0 (i.e., from the leafs to the root of 
the corresponding tree). For every layer  d , construct the relation “ s is higher than 
t ” for instances  s, t of that layer (using Definition 5 and the already constructed 
relation over layer  d + 1 ) and check that the condition is satisfied over nodes in that 
layer. Using this algorithm, the reader can verify that the experimental observation 
in the following example cannot be explained by a partially restricted conjectured 
experiment.
Example 3 (Explainability Algorithm): Consider the Example depicted in Figure 3 
(notation following that of our previous examples). Note that  (u) is revealed higher 
than  (d) . However, algorithmically proceeding from the leafs to layer 1 we see that, 
from layer 3,  (d, u) and  (d, d) are revealed higher than  (u, u) , and from layer 2, (d, u) and  (d, d) are also revealed higher than  (u, d) , which therefore implies that (d) is revealed higher than  (u) . In particular, the condition of Theorem 3 is not satis-
fied and these observations cannot be explained by a partially restricted conjectured 
experiment.
Example 3 also demonstrates that lack of “simple reversals” of the type of 
Example 2 is not sufficient for experimental observations to admit an explanation 
by a partially restricted conjectured experiment.
V. Conclusions
This paper provides a theoretical framework for analyzing experimental data 
accounting for subjects’ conjectures regarding the experimental design itself. When 
subjects’ conjectures are unrestricted, we illustrate an “anything goes” result: any 
experimental observations can be explained with standard updating and the appro-
priate choice of a conjectured experiment (in fact, generically, multiple conjec-
tured experiments would explain the observations). When subjects’ conjectures are 
restricted, in terms of the perceived correlation between the amount of information 
revealed to them in the lab and the underlying realized uncertainty, our results pro-
vide a full characterization of the testable implications standard updating entails. 
To the extent that experimental transparency (say, regarding the way information is 
generated in the lab) yields more restricted conjectures, the overwhelming message 
from our results is that transparency is crucial for meaningful testable implications 
of theoretical predictions pertaining to decision making under uncertainty.
21 In terms of technical generality, we note that Theorems 1, 2, and 3 all easily extend to environments in which 
the number of signals is not bounded. 
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Appendix
A. Restricted Conjectured Experiments
PROOF OF LEMMA 1: 
Let  {α, ζ} be random variables that satisfy the condition of the Lemma. Then, for 
every  n < N and every  s = ( s 1 , … ,  s n ) ∈  S n it follows from condition 2 and the 
law of total probability that
   p s [a] = P (α = a |  ζ i =  s i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n) 
 =  ∑ 
s∈S
 
 P ( ζ n+1 = s |  ζ i =  s i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n) 
 · P (α = a |  ζ i =  s i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n,  ζ n+1 = s) =  ∑ 
s∈S
 
  λ s  p sˆs [a] , 
where  λ s = P ( ζ n+1 = s |  ζ i =  s i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n) > 0 by condition 1. There-
fore,  p s ∈ ri (Conv {  p sˆs | s ∈ S} ) as desired.
Assume now that for every  s = ( s 1 , … ,  s n ) one has  p s ∈ ri (Conv {  p sˆs | s ∈ S} ) , 
so that
(7)  p s =  ∑ 
s∈S
 






























Figure 3. Algorithmically Checking Consistency
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for some  λ sˆs > 0 such that  ∑ s   λ sˆs = 1 . Let  ζ 1 , … ,  ζ n , α be random variables 
such that
(8)  P ( ζ n+1 = s |  ζ 1 =  s 1 , … ,  ζ n =  s n ) =  λ sˆs 
for every  n < N ,  s = ( s 1 , … ,  s n ) ,  s ∈ S , and
(9)  P (α = a |  ζ 1 =  s 1 , … ,  ζ N =  s N ) =  p s [a] 
for every  s = ( s 1 , … ,  s N ) . Since  λ sˆs > 0 , it follows from (8) that
  P ( ζ 1 =  s 1 , … ,  ζ N =  s N ) =  Π n<N P ( ζ n+1 =  s n+1 |  ζ 1 =  s 1 , … ,  ζ n =  s n ) > 0, 
so that the first condition in Lemma 1 is satisfied. We now prove the second condi-
tion by backward induction over  n . For  n = N the condition follows from (9). Let 
n < N ,  s = ( s 1 , … ,  s n ) ∈ S , and assume the condition is true for  n + 1 . Then,
  P(α = a |  ζ i =  s i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n)
   =  ∑ s  P( ζ n+1 = s |  ζ i =  s i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n)
 ⋅ P(α = a |  ζ i =  s i  for  1 ≤ i ≤ n + 1) =  ∑ s   λ sˆs  p sˆs [a] =  p s [a] , 
where the first equality follows from the law of total probability, the second from (8) 
and the induction hypothesis, and the third from (7). ∎
PROOF OF LEMMA 2: 
If  a 1 = ⋯ =  a m = arg max p then we can choose  p i = p for  1 ≤ i ≤ m. 
Assume now that  a 1 ≠  a 2 . We choose  p 3 , … ,  p m ∈  ∆ ∗ (A) arbitrarily such that 
arg  max a   p i [a] =  a i . Let  ε > 0 be sufficiently small so that  (m − 2)ε < 1 and 
p′ ∈  ∆ ∗ (A) , where
(10)  p′ =  1 __________ 
1 − (m − 2) ε  ( p − ε (  p 3 + ⋯ +  p m )) . 
The existence of such  ε follows from the fact that  ∆ ∗ (A) is an open set and the 
 right-hand side of (10) converges to  p ∈  ∆ ∗ (A) as  ε goes to  0 .
We now define  p 1 and  p 2 . Choose  q such that
(11)  max 
a
   p [a] < q <  1 _ | A | − 1 , 
and let  r = 1 −  ∑ a≠ a 1 ,  a 2  
 
p′ [a] − q. Note that from the fact that  p′ [a] <  1 _ | A | − 1
for every  a ∈ A and  q <  1 _ | A | − 1 it follows that  r > 0 . Moreover, since  q > p′[ a 1 ] 
it follows that
(12)  r = 1 −  ∑ 
a≠ a 1 ,  a 2 
   p′ [a] − q < 1 −  ∑ 
a≠ a 2 
   p′ [a] = p′ [ a 2 ] < q <  1 _ | A | − 1 .
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For  i = 1, 2 and  j = 3 − i , let
(13)  p i [a] = p′[a] for a ≠  a 1 ,  a 2 
(14)  p i [ a i ] = q
(15)  p i [ a j ] = r .
Then, it follows from (12) that  p i ∈  ∆ ∗ (A) and  arg  max a   p i [a] =  a i .
In addition, it follows from (11) and (12) that  r < p′[ a 2 ] < q . Therefore,
(16)  p′[ a 2 ] = λr + (1 − λ) q 
for some  0 < λ < 1 . We claim that
(17)  p′ = λ  p 1 + (1 − λ) p 2 
(18)  i.e., p′[a] = λ  p 1 [a] + (1 − λ) p 2 [a] for every a ∈ A. 
Indeed, for  a ≠  a 1 ,  a 2 , the equality follows from the fact that, by (13),  p 1 [a] =  p 2 [a] = p′[a] . For  a =  a 2 , the equality follows from (14), (15), and (16). For 
a =  a 1 , the equality follows from the equality in all other coordinates and the fact 
that both sides of (18) sum to  1 (over  a ∈ A ). Finally, it follows from (10) and (17) 
that
  p =  (1 − (m − 2) ε) p′ + ε ( p 3 + ⋯ +  p m ) 
 =  λ 1  p 1 +  λ 2  p 2 +  λ 3  p 3 + ⋯ +  λ m  p m ,
where
  λ 1 =  (1 − (m − 2) ε) · λ,
  λ 2 =  (1 − (m − 2) ε) · (1 − λ), and
  λ 3 = ⋯ =  λ m = ε .
Therefore,  p ∈ ri (Conv {  p 1 , … ,  p m } ) , as desired. ∎
B. Unrestricted Conjectured Experiments
PROOF OF LEMMA 3: 
Choose arbitrarily a distribution  ν over   ×  S N with full support. Let  α, τ, ζ be 
random variables over some probability space  (Ω, , P) with values in  A, ,  S N 
such that:
 (i) The joint distribution of  τ and  ζ is  ν .
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 (ii) The conditional distribution of  α given  τ = n and  ζ = x is  p s , where 
s = x |  n ,
(19)  P (α = a | τ = n, ζ = x) =  p s [a] .
We proceed to prove that (6) is satisfied for every instance  s = ( s 1 , … ,  s n ) . The 
event  {τ = n,  ζ i =  s i for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n} is the disjoint union of the events {τ = n, ζ = x} , ranging over all  x ∈  S N such that  x |  n = s . Therefore, by the law 
of total probability,
   P (α = a | τ = n,  ζ i =  s i ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n) 
    =  ∑ 
x∈ S N and x  | n =s
   P (ζ = x | τ = n,  ζ i =  s i ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n) 
 × P (α = a | τ = n, ζ = x) =  p s [a] , 
where the last equality follows from (19). ∎
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